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Chapter 12
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STABILITY AS CORRELATES OF
TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN UNION*
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Zagreb
Aleksandar Štulhofer
Faculty of Philosophy
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a comparative empirical analysis of social val-
ues in Croatia, the European Union (EU), the countries joining in the first
round, and a group of European countries outside the EU. Following up
on the analysis of the data obtained in international research into European
values carried out at the end of the 90’s on national samples of most
European countries, the authors have endeavoured to determine the differ-
ences in the spread of post-material values and the scope of social capital.
The objective is to define where, in terms of social values, Croatia is cur-
rently located, and thus to sketch out its readiness or lack of readiness for
joining the EU. In the second part, the paper offers a comparative analy-
sis of factors that affect the level of public confidence in the EU.
* The authors took an equal part in the writing of this paper. We would like to thank the
anonymous reviewer for comments and proposals that have removed at least some of the
shortcomings.
Key words:
socio-cultural values, post-materialism, social capital, transition costs,
confidence in the European Union, Croatia
INTRODUCTION
According to figures from the Ministry for European Integration
(www.mei.hr), most citizens of Croatia want to join the EU. Although
in 2003 the percentage of those who think it is necessary to join the EU
has fallen since 2000 (74% as against 78%), almost three quarters of the
respondents still think that such a course of events would be positive.
Is this entirely an assessment of personal gain, neglecting any possible
effects of integration on the country as a whole? Figures show a logical
link between the assessment of personal and national benefit from join-
ing the EU. Thus, 66% expect a higher standard of living as a conse-
quence, and as many as 75% expect general progress.
The objective of this paper is to show how distant from or close
to the EU Croatia is from the point of view of values. We are interest-
ed in how much the values that we consider stimulating to development
are widespread in Croatia as compared with the EU, or how much, to
put it another way, the EU is different from us. The magnitude of this
difference is important both for a country that wants to become a mem-
ber (greater differences imply greater difficulties in adjustment to the
EU system of standards) and for those who decide to take on the new
members. An example of the latter point can be found in the muted
voices that consider the values in Turkey, a Muslim country, impossi-
ble to harmonise with those of the European tradition. 
In order to make the comparison, the distribution of values, or
sets of values, is presented separately for three groups of countries: the
EU members, the accession countries, and the countries that are not part
of the EU. In the empirical analyses that follow, we start from the
assumption that individual values that reflect social, political or eco-
nomic dimensions can be concisely presented and analyzed (Štulhofer
and Rimac, 2002; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002). In order to do so, we
use three theoretical models. The first of them, the theory of post-mate-
rialism, defines the change in global values as a shift from materialist
to post-materialist values. The second model, the social capital theory,
focuses on social cohesion, social trust and cooperativeness. Recent
research (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Torsvik, 2000) has pointed to
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a positive correlation between post-materialism and social capital on
the one hand, and economic growth and political development on the
other. The third model introduces some specific features of the process
of post-communist transition (Štulhofer, 2000).
Since in this paper we also wish to sketch out the measures that
could stimulate convergence in values, in the second part of the paper
we analyse the structure of trust and confidence in the EU. In this part we
identify the political, economic and social predictors of trust in the EU.
In the next step, we use this analysis to outline a set of specific recom-
mendations regarding Croatia's ambition to become a member of the EU.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
THE THREE MODELS
The importance of culture, of specific social values, of institu-
tions and manners (tradition) for economic growth and political values
is no longer controversial. This is best shown by the recently inaugurat-
ed development project of the World Bank called Social Capital for
Development (www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital). However, the
question of the empirical measurement of social values is more com-
plex and controversial (Grix, 2001). In order to be able to avoid mak-
ing conclusions on the basis of simple indicators such as the question:
“Do you support democracy?”, which avoids the issue of the different
understandings of democracy and of conforming to social expectations,
we base the analysis of the distribution of specific values on three the-
oretical constructs. Each of these is an interlinked set of political, eco-
nomic and socio-cultural values.
Model of post-materialist change
The model of social change proposed by the American political
scientist Ronald Inglehart is one of the most theoretically elegant and
empirically most investigated theories of globalisation (Abramson and
Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997). The model starts off from the
assumption that social development is no chaotic and accidental
process, but is inextricably linked with a specific structure of values
(Inglehart, 1995). Although the claim that socio-cultural values can be
grouped into coherent sets, value orientations, is not new, the innova-
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tiveness of Inglehart’s model rests in the thesis that value orientations
are both the cause and effect of economic and political development. In
this way, there is a high degree of similarity between the developed
countries, as well as between the less developed countries, but not
between these two groups. Inglehart’s assumptions, it can easily be seen,
are based on the modernization theory and postulate linear development.
When he talks of value systems, Inglehart distinguishes three:
traditional, modern and post-modern. The last two are global conse-
quences of the industrial or the post-industrial revolution. As for the
post-modern orientation, its beginning is usually placed in the 1960s
when in the developed countries of the West the post-modern transition
commenced; this was characterised by the spread of what were called
post-materialist values. Table 1 presents in a condensed way the trans-
formation of values described. At the micro level, the most recent
changes are shown in the growth of the number of post-materialists,
particularly in the younger generations (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995;
Inglehart, 1997). At the same time, there is a decline in the popularity
of materialist values, which were dominant in industrial societies.
Table 1 Materialist and post-materialist value systems
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Modern societies
(domination of material-
ist values)
Post-modern societies
(domination of post-
materialist values)
Fundamental social goal Economic growth and
political stability
Development of human
rights and liberties
Personal ends Maximising utility;
growth in purchasing
power
Maximising individuali-
ty; development of per-
sonal identities
Central social authority Rational and legal (laws) Self-regulation
What is post-materialist development conditioned by? According
to Inglehart, it is mainly the consequence of the growth of prosperity. The
relationship between dominant social values and the level of social devel-
opment shown primarily through standard of living Inglehart defines in
terms of two linked hypotheses (Inglehart, 1995). The first of them, the
shortage hypothesis, puts forward the idea that individual preferences are
caused by the socio-economic situation. In conditions of shortage,
motives concerning pure existence and survival prevail, and in conditions
of abundance, those that transcend them. The socialisation hypothesis, on
the other hand, offers a mechanism of value internalisation, stressing the
crucial importance of the process of early socialisation. Growing up in a
stable environment, security and prosperity stimulates the internalisation
and development of post-modern values. The rising importance of the
post-materialist value orientation is seen in the new civil initiatives, in the
growth of ecological sensitivity, in growing tolerance, multiculturalism
and in cosmopolitanism, in the increasing emphasis on human rights and
personal identities, the strengthening of the idea of self-regulation and the
rejection of classical political ideologies.i Thus the expectation of the
model is that support for the EU will reflect the spread of post-material-
ist, transnational values in the national population.ii
Social capital theory
The idea of social capital is probably the most popular of all
those that have emerged in the social sciences in the last ten years (Grix,
2001; Hospers and Van Lochem, 2002).iii The reason for this should be
sought in the dissatisfaction with the predictive capacities of the classi-
cal theory of modernisation, according to which growth and develop-
ment are predicated on universal and rational institutions. Against this
postulate, a series of investigations have pointed to the mediating role of
culture, which in some cases supports and in other cases thwarts or holds
up development. Specific norms and collective habits can, behind the
façade of formal institutions, make a mockery of market and democrat-
ic competition. An unpropitious cultural matrix results in chronic eco-
nomic, political and social backwardness (Štulhofer, 2001:53-78). The
first appears in inadequate growth, the second in prolonged political
instability and undemocratic proceedings, and the last in general lack of
trust, cynicism, opportunism and a high level of social pathology.
What is the general trait of a propitious cultural matrix?
According to social capital theorists (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993;
Torsvik, 2000; Fukuyama, 2000), its features are mutual trust, generally
accepted standards of cooperation and social networks or links between
members of the community. According to the influential Putnam study
(1993) of the development of Italy, the whole of these features – social
capitaliv - is the generator of economic development and political stabil-
ity. Unlike the closed circle of underdevelopment, in societies/commu-
nities rich in social capital, a positive development loop is at work: cul-
tural habits produce wealth that then in turn increases the social capital.
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Empirically, social capital consists of three dimensions (Figure
1). The first of them, trust, denotes initial readiness to cooperate – and
not only with members of the family or acquaintances (Fukuyama,
1995; Mistal, 1996). The second dimension, association/connectedness,
and the related collective actions, make possible the direct experience
of cooperation and its advantages, such as the fulfilment of interests that
are beyond the scope of individual action. Social linkage or networking
thus works as a school for trust and collaboration. The last dimension,
respect for standards or civility,v is at the same time the result of the
working of the first two dimensions and it is their support and buttress.
Figure 1 Structure of social capital
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Respect for
norms (civility)
Association
Trust
What kind of relation between social capital and trust in the EU
does this model predict? Although the theoretical link is not yet clear-
ly expressed, one should expect (as in the case of post-materialism) that
social capital should have a positive effect on the way the EU is seen,
both because of its encouragement of social and economic cooperation
and because of the links related to the possibility of wider networking.
But an alternative interpretation is also possible. If the process of
European integration, and hence the institutions and practice of the EU,
are seen as threats to established, local and national, networks (McLaren,
2002), social capital will be negatively correlated with trust in the EU.
Situational reaction model
Neither the post-materialism nor the social capital theory takes
into account the specific, transitional features of European post-com-
munist societies. Within the universal postulates of the Inglehart theo-
ry, such socio-cultural specificities are of secondary importance and are
responsible for short-lasting oscillations in the general trend of post-
materialism (Inglehart, 1995). In the second model, socio-cultural traits
are central, but only in a quantitative sense (Putnam, 1993). Countries
can thus be distinguished according to quantity but not according to
type (or quality) of social capital.
Considering that both models display a tendency to neglect the
transitional reality of post-communism - a process of such great impor-
tance for the countries of C, S and SE Europe - we have decided to
include a third explanatory model into our theoretical framework. Its
role is to contribute to the interpretation of the structure of trust in the
EU by taking into account socioeconomic costs of transition.
The situational reaction model (Štulhofer, 2000:149-177)
assumes that in moments of major social changes, the perception and
evaluation of the current economic political and social conditions will
determine the dominant values. For example, observation of a large num-
ber of injustices, irregularities and abuses during the process of econom-
ic and political changes, and, in particular, the failure to penalise them,
will result in widespread cynicism and opportunism. Starting out from
the definition of post-communism as fundamental change in economic,
political and social life, one accompanied by vast transitional costs (indi-
vidual and collective), the model predicts that the perception of the EU
will be considerably affected by the respondent’s assessment of the
course of the transitional processes to date. Since the citizens of countries
that do not belong to the EU know as a rule very little about the EU insti-
tutions and their activities, their estimate of the EU will be a reflection of
the effectiveness of the relevant domestic institutions (Anderson, 1998).
METHODOLOGY
Sample
In the analyses we use data collected in the third wave of the
European Values Survey (EVS), a research project that started in 1980
with the aim of providing systematic monitoring of the value orientations
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(concerning religion, morality, work, politics and society) of the citizens
in European countries. The initial survey in 10 Western European coun-
tries in 1981 was extended in 1990 and, again, in 1999/2000 when it cov-
ered thirty-three countries. Thus the data collected in 1999/2000 are a
good basis for the comparison of the values and standpoints of people in
different European countries. In all the countries, a single questionnaire
was used and rigorous procedures and checks were used to secure the
equivalence of questions after translation. In each country a probabilistic
sample of the over-18 population was polled, and all the samples consist-
ed of at least 1,000 respondents. The Croatian part of the EVS was car-
ried out by a research team led by J. Baloban of the Catholic Theology
Faculty in Zagreb (Rimac and Èrpiæ, 2000). Under the guidance of the
University of Tilburg Research Centre (WORC, Tilburg University) and
the Central Archive in Cologne, data were checked and aggregated
enabling comparative analyses. In this paper we use the fourth revision
of the 1999/2000 dataset.
Instruments
The measure of post-materialism as opposed to materialism rep-
resents a standard recoding of the selection of preferred objectives of
the country. The respondents were asked to choose two out of four
items offered (keeping order in the state; giving more rights to people
to go on record about important decisions of the government; fight
against the rise in prices; protection of liberty of speech). Their task was
to select the first and the second most important societal goal in their
respective countries. If they chose the first and third goal, which corre-
spond to materialism, then they were classified as materialists. If they
chose two goals that suggest post-materialist viewpoints, they were
classified as post-materialist, while respondents that chose one materi-
alist and one post-materialist goal were placed in the mixed orientation
group. In the regression analysis, a greater value of the index of post-
materialism indicates a greater acceptance of post-materialist values.
The opportunism index is an average response value on two ques-
tions asking if it is acceptable to evade tax if you have the chance and to
receive bribes at work. The correlation between the variables is moder-
ate (r = .38). Higher values on the scale indicate greater opportunism.
The trust in the institutions of the country’s political system index
is the arithmetical mean of answers on a scale of one to four, in which
lower values denote complete trust, and higher values complete lack of
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trust in the institutions evaluated. The following institutions were includ-
ed in the index: church, army, education system, press, unions, police,
parliament, civil service, social security, health care system and judiciary.
The reliability of the index is satisfactory (Cronbach alpha = .83).
The Social networking indicator, that is, the indicator of the
involvement of citizens in civil initiatives is a variable that measures
the frequency of spending time with “people in clubs and voluntary
organisations” (non-governmental sector). Respondents were given a
scale with the following responses: not at all, a few times a year, once
or twice a month, every week.
Generalised trust was measured by the following question: “In
general, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have
to be cautious in your dealings with people?”
Trust in norms was measured indirectly, through respondent's per-
ception of the respect for/violation of norms in his or her community. The
logic of using this perception of civility index was as follows: the more
others respect norms, the greater the motivation of the respondent to do
the same. The likelihood that an actor will respect norms depends, sub-
stantially, on his or her perception of the relevant procedures of others.
Such behavioural strategy is doubly rational – in a cost/benefit sense, as
well as socially (maintaining one's reputation). The perception of civility
index is the arithmetical mean of answers to ten questions about how
widespread violation of norms is in respondent's place of residence.vi A
scale with four points was used (almost all, many, some, almost no one).
The reliability of the index is satisfactory (Cronbach alpha = .80).
Satisfaction with the development of democracy is measured by
the question: “How satisfied are you with the development of democ-
racy in our country?” As an indicator of satisfaction with the govern-
ment we used the following question: “People have various opinions
about the manner and system in which the country is governed. On the
scale indicate your opinion about how things are.” Respondents were
offered a 10-point scale, with 1 being very bad and 10 being very good.
GDP data were not an original part of the EVS, but were added
subsequently in order to quantify the effect of national economy on
respondents' attitudes and values.
RESULTS I: SOCIO-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
In this section we present the results of the statistical analyses of
value orientations. The first part is a descriptive analysis of the spread
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of the distinct value orientations, particularly of post-materialism and
those related to social capital, in three groups of countries: EU mem-
bers, accession countries and countries that are not members, including
Croatia. We consider this discussion an important one, especially in the
light of the future of the collective European identity that the idea of the
EU idea postulates. A European people are not imaginable, as
Prentoulis (2001:196) observes, as an outcome of common history or
culture, but only as the product of “newly formed political values”.
Figure 2 Comparison of percent of materialists, postmaterialists and mixed
type persons in different countries (%)
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of post-material values. In line
with the results of an earlier work (Inglehart and Baker, 2000), our data
show considerable differences in the presence of post-materialism in
the three groups of countries (F=1047.7; p<.01). According to expecta-
tions based on Inglehart’s assumption of the link between prosperity
and the abandonment of materialist values, post-materialism appears
most often in EU countries, and most seldom in the group of non-EU
countries. However, Croatia deviates markedly from the non-EU group
average. It can easily be seen that the level of post-materialist values in
Croatia is on a level with the EU average. The fact that the same is also
true for Turkey and for Slovenia (in the accession group) suggests a
combination of economic (standard of living) and non-economic (expo-
sure to Western cultural influences) sources for post-materialism.
Figure 3 Generalized trust in different countries (%)
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Figure 3 presents the first indicator of social trust, the first of the
three dimensions of social capital. This is the so-called generalised
trust, that is, the level of initial readiness to cooperate with unknown
individuals. Analysis points out the different levels of generalised trust
(F=570.01, p<.01). According to expectation, it is greatest in the EU
countries, irrespective of the variations expressed inside the group. The
highest levels of generalised trust are in the countries of northern
Europe (Denmark, Sweden, Holland and Finland), and the lowest in the
Mediterranean part (Portugal, France and Greece). The difference in the
level of trust between the EU accession countries and the countries out-
side the EU is not statistically significant. Although generalised trust is
a dominant feature only in the countries of Northern Europe – which
indicates that the differences should be perhaps conceived as differ-
ences in the levels of mistrust, rather than trust – one should point out
that generalised trust in Croatia is twice as low as the EU average.
Figure 4 Comparison of trust in political institutions in different countries (%)
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The second indicator of social trust is trust in institutions. Figure
4 shows the aggregate level of trust in 11 social institutions. As in the
previous case, trust is most expressed in the EU countries followed by
the non-EU countries (F=239.33, p<.01). As for this important segment
of social stability, the level of trust in Croatia is the same as the mean
for the accession countries. Among these countries, trust in institutions
is most widespread in Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, which
could be the consequence of economic growth (Poland, Lithuania),
political and economic stability (Slovenia), and the abolition of author-
itarian government in the case of Slovakia.
Figure 5 Trust in the reigning standards of society - the civility index (%)
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Figure 5 presents the last indicator of social trust: trust in social
norms. As already explained, the perception of civility index that is
used here does not measure trust in (and accordingly respect for) norms
directly, but indirectly. It points to the likelihood that the respondent
will respect the norms. The more widespread, in the respondent’s opin-
ion, the violation of norms, the less likely it is that s/he will trust the
same norms. The basic assumption here is, of course, that the respon-
dents are at least relatively rational, that is that their actions are not
independent of experience and tactical (interactional) considerations. In
a milieu in which norms are not respected, legalistic behaviour is very
expensive – both financially and in terms of reputation.
According to our results, perception of civility is most wide-
spread again in EU countries, with the level being highest in Holland,
Denmark and Sweden, and lowest in the Mediterranean zone (Greek,
Italy, Portugal). The highest infringement of standards, that is the low-
est level of civility, is perceived by respondents in the transition coun-
tries, equally in the accession countries and in the non-EU countries.vii
If we consider the graph in more detail, the lack of difference between
the accession countries and the countries outside the EU (both groups
differ from the EU countries (EU / F = 96.2, p<.01) is the consequence
of the extremely widespread perception of the infringement of norms in
Hungary. If we subtract this country from the analysis, the level of
civility in the accession countries becomes statistically higher than that
of the countries outside the EU. In this respect it should be stressed that
the perception of civility in Croatia is somewhere between the average
of the EU countries and the accession countries.
Along with trust and respect for norms, social connectedness
(association) is the third key dimension of social capital. Instead of the
standard way of measuring the density of social networks, which uses
the percentage of respondents involved in voluntary organisations, we
decided here on a different approach. Since the usual measurement is
not sensitive to the different levels of members' activity (Putnam,
2000), we measured the level of association by the amount of free time
that respondent spent in activities of the NGO of which s/he is a mem-
ber (Figure 6).
All three groups of countries differ according to the level of
social connectedness (F=834.63, p<.01). Bearing in mind that associa-
tion is positively related to civil society, the expected order is expect-
ed: the density is greatest in the EU countries, and lowest in the non-
EU countries. Considering the theoretical and empirical link between
trust and social connectedness (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002), this cor-
roborates the findings on trust, and stresses the difficulties the develop-
ment of civil society meets in countries with trust deficit (Mishler and
Rose, 1997).
As in most of the previous analyses, Croatia shows an aberration
here from the other countries in the non-EU group, too. The density of
social connectedness in Croatia is greater than the average of the acces-
sion group. How is this to be explained? There are two possible reasons.
According to the first, Croatia - like Slovenia and unlike the other post-
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socialist countries surveyed - inherited some kind of foundation of civic
organisation, thanks to the greater openness of the former Yugoslav
regime. This enabled the more rapid development of the civil society sec-
tor. According to the second interpretation, the rapid development of civic
associations is primarily the consequence of the war or, more precisely, of
local and international humanitarian initiatives prompted by the war.
Figure 6 Free time spent in Non-Governmental Organizations in different
countries (%)
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The next two graphs present data related to the situational reaction
model. Table 2 offers a comparative view of respondent's evaluation of
democracy in his/her country. In Eastern European countries this is an
indicator of the satisfaction with the basic outcome of the political transi-
tion. Consequently, one should be cautious in interpreting the differences
between countries with a longer democratic tradition and those with rela-
tively little experience of democratic rule. It is possible that the threshold
of sensitivity to mistakes and abuse in the democratic procedure is lower
in the first group, simply because the citizens have become accustomed to
high standards of political behaviour and general political stability.
Table 2 Satisfaction with democracy in various countries (%)
Very satisfied Satisfied Not very Dissatisfied
satisfied
Denmark 12.3 54.7 30.0 3.0
Portugal 10.1 66.5 20.2 3.2
Germany 10.0 65.4 19.7 4.9
Ireland 9.9 53.6 30.0 6.4
Austria 7.8 69.2 20.2 2.8
Greece 7.5 47.8 35.8 9.0
Spain 6.6 53.9 33.3 6.2
Netherlands 6.4 67.4 24.2 2.0
UK 5.5 48.2 35.0 11.3
France 4.4 45.0 39.3 11.3
Finland 4.0 52.6 39.2 4.3
Sweden 2.9 57.0 34.4 5.7
Belgium 2.4 46.9 35.0 15.7
Italy 1.6 34.3 52.7 11.4
EU countries
- average 6.5 54.5 32.1 6.9
Poland 2.0 43.2 41.6 13.1
Estonia 2.0 33.8 51.8 12.3
Hungary 1.8 29.6 56.2 12.5
Lithuania 1.6 23.9 52.5 22.0
Latvia 1.3 29.0 59.5 10.3
Slovenia 0.9 44.1 44.4 10.6
Slovakia 0.8 22.6 52.9 23.7
Czech Republic 0.7 36.5 49.7 13.0
Accession countries
- average 1.4 32.8 51.1 14.7
Croatia 2.2 14.7 58.4 24.6
Belarus 5.8 27.1 39.2 27.8
Turkey 3.1 20.7 25.7 50.6
Bulgaria 2.9 24.5 49.8 22.7
Romania 1.7 19.2 52.2 26.9
Ukraine 1.4 14.2 48.5 35.8
Russia 0.4 6.7 42.9 50.0
Countries outside
the EU- average 2.5 18.2 45.3 34.1
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According to our results, there are significant differences in the
assessment of the state of democracy between the three groups of coun-
tries (F = 3121.11, p<.001). Contrary to the "greater sensitivity"
assumption, the greatest satisfaction is displayed by the EU respon-
dents. Predictably, the least satisfied were respondents from non-EU
countries where the evasion of democratic procedures is most frequent
and most flagrant. Here, Croatia is closer to the non-EU average than
to the average score of accession countries. It should be emphasized
that Croatian data were collected in April 1999, eight months before the
general elections characterized by the widespread dissatisfaction with
the ruling party.
The next indicator, satisfaction with current government activi-
ties, is shown in Figure 7. As in the previous case, all three groups of
countries differ significantly (F = 3064.62, p<.01). The level of satis-
faction is highest in the EU countries, and lowest in the non-EU coun-
tries. Again, the average value for Croatia is lower than the mean value
of the accession countries. Of all the countries included in the analysis,
only in three countries (Lithuania, Russia and Turkey) the satisfaction
is lower than in Croatia.
Figure 7 Average satisfaction with government performance in different
countries (ten point scale)
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Summing up the findings of the analyses carried out so far, it
should be pointed out that in almost all the measured value dimensions
significant differences among the three groups of countries exist. The
differences co-exist with many overlaps, which are the consequence of
the important cultural, historical and political within-group differences
(Laitin, 2002). 
Do our findings support an optimistic (Zielonka and Mair,
2002; Laitin, 2002) or a pessimistic (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002;
Rohrschneider, 2002) view of the outcome of the future enlargement
of the EU? In our view, both positions are ideologically biased. The
methodology on which all the relevant studies have been based,
including ours, simply does not allow for a differentiation between
quantitative (“difference in degree”) from qualitative (“incompatible”)
differences.viii
Regarding post-materialism and social capital in Croatia, their
levels are most often similar to those of the accession countries, that is,
they differ considerably from the non-EU averages. But this does not
hold true for the assessment of democracy and the government. The
levels of satisfaction with the state of democracy and government activ-
ities in Croatia are substantially lower than those in the accession coun-
tries. To say that they are situational effects, a reflection of the wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the way the transition processes were man-
aged in the nineties, does not mean that they cannot have more lasting
consequences - especially if dissatisfaction with the government beco-
mes chronic. As Misler and Rose (1997:441) argue, an evaluation of the
government is closely related to trust and explains the greater percent-
age of its variance than indicators of “cultural inertia” (socialist her-
itage).
RESULTS II: TRUST IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
In the second part of the paper we test trust in the EU, which we
consider crucial for the debate about the dynamics and consequences of
EU enlargement and the positioning of Croatia within this process. First
we present the differences in trust in the EU, and then proceed with an
interpretation based on an analysis of the factors affecting it.
The distribution of trust in the EU in the three groups of coun-
tries shown in Figure 8 indicates differences between the EU and the
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accession countries on the one hand, and the non-EU countries on the
other. Trust is highest in the member countries and then in the associ-
ate countries. The difference between these two groups does not attain
statistical significance, but both differ from the non-EU countries
(F=75.95, p<.01). Trust in the EU is lowest in the countries outside the
EU. What is the situation in Croatia? The figures are encouraging. The
level of trust in the EU in Croatia is comparable to the average levels in
the EU countries and the accession countries.
Figure 8 Confidence in the European Union in different countries (%)
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The fact that the more successful transitional countries show a
higher level of trust in the EU than the less successful seems to be based
on the belief of the citizens that integration is a guarantee for the con-
tinuation of reforms which they view favourably. Using another data-
base (Central and Eastern European Eurobarometer), Tucker et all.,
(2002) show that this holds at the national level too, that is within each
individual transitional country. As their analyses show, successful
states (the winners) are characterized by greater trust in the EU than the
unsuccessful (the losers). Transitional specifics of the dynamics of trust
in the EU are emphasized in a research study (Alvarez, 2003) showing
that union membership is negatively correlated to the trust in the EU in
Western European countries, but is positively correlated to it in Eastern
European countries.
How can one explain the differences in trust in the EU? To iden-
tify the factors affecting the trust, we included all the three explanatory
models (the post-materialist changes, social capital and situational reac-
tion models) in a regression equation, adding an additional indicator of
situational reaction (opportunism index) and the measure of economic
development (per capita GDP). The results of this multivariate analysis
are shown in Table 3. Although because of the size of the overall sam-
ple (about 35,000 respondents) seven of the nine indicators reach the
level of statistical significance set in advance (p<.01), the most power-
ful predictor of trust in the EU is trust in the national institutions. This
finding corroborates Anderson’s thesis (1998), according to which citi-
zens, when they do not have enough information about the EU, use an
evaluation of local (national) institutions and government as proxy. The
two indicators of situational reaction - satisfaction with democracy and
the government - are less strong correlates, but they clearly indicate the
impact of the post-communist transition on the way the EU is perceived.
Contrary to our expectations, the effect of the economic devel-
opment indicator (GDP) on trust in the EU is rather small. How should
this be interpreted? Setting aside the issue of how reliable an indicator
of the state of economy the GDP is, it is possible that GDP has an indi-
rect, rather than direct, influence expressed through non-economic or
exogenous variables.ix The analysis of the cross-correlations points to
the significant linkages between the degree of economic development
and socio-cultural indicators.x To test this hypothesis fully an applica-
tion of the modelling techniques will be required (Arminger and Clogg,
1995).xi
In a summary of the findings of the analysis of trust in the EU,
it is important to stress two things. Firstly, trust in the EU is significant-
ly greater in the set of successful transition countries. Countries still
searching a way out of the transition-caused recession and anomie are
markedly more distrustful of the EU. Secondly, our analysis indicates
that socio-cultural dimensions are important predictors of the trust.
Nevertheless, since a series of methodological restrictions rendered dis-
tinguishing between economic and non-economic effects impossible,
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the domination of the latter in the regression analysis should be taken
with caution. 
Table 3 Correlates of trust in the European Union 
b Beta
Generalised trust .05* .03*
Trust in institutions .62* .36*
Trust in norms (civility) .04* .03*
Association (social connectedness) .01 .02
Satisfaction with democracy .12* .11*
Satisfaction with government .03* .08*
Opportunism -.02* -.03*
Post-materialism .09* .06*
Per capita GDP (1999) .00* .06*
*p<.01; R2 =.18
Clearly, our results do not support Laitin's (2002:76) claim that
the problems of integration of new members of the EU – if there will be
any at all – will not be the consequences of “cultural differences”.xii
Without discarding the possibility of political frictions, which are at the
moment best described as the fear of the new members of being granted
a second rate status (Zielonka and Mair, 2002), socio-cultural differences
are real and under certain conditions could well be generators of conflict. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the previous sections we have attempted to answer two ques-
tions: how far is Croatia, value-wise, from the EU, and what determines
trust in the EU? The answer to the first question is that in most of the
dimensions – with an exception of satisfaction with the government –
Croatia seems to be similar to the 10 accession countries. When trust in
the EU is considered, the crucial factor turned out to be the confidence
of the respondents in the institutions of their own societies. Anderson
(1998) offered an explanation of this finding: we make an assessment
of institutions we do not have enough information or experience about
according to an assessment of the work of comparable institutions
about which we do have information. In other words, respondents, par-
ticularly those with lower levels of education, often judge transnation-
al institutions on the basis of their perception of national institutions.
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Both our answers indicate the importance of measures that
would help increasing convergence in values with the EU. The point of
such measures, of course, is not just to facilitate and speed up Croatian
integration into the EU, but, primarily, to achieve a greater level of
social trust, economic success and political stability. Although it may
sound trivial, it should be emphasized that the desire for a value change
must not be motivated by political correctness, or the need to present
ourselves more favourably to those whose club we want to enter, but by
efforts to improve the Croatian reality. The authors of this paper do not
see the common EU Culture as a value in itself, rather something that
has a potential of making the everyday life in the members' societies
more pleasant and successful.
Six brief recommendations we present in conclusion are based
on the previous analyses, as well as on authors' earlier research (Štul-
hofer, 2001; Štulhofer and Rimac, 2002). Their ordering, we should
add, does not reflect their relative importance, nor does it rank the rec-
ommendations according to implementation priority. 
Fight against corruption. The objective is to halt the spread of
cynicism and opportunism, particularly among youth (Štulhofer and
Rimac, 2002). In order to achieve this it is necessary to step up the work
of the existing institutions (particularly the recently established office
against corruption) and their presence in the media. Anti-corruption
campaign must be systematic, meaning that it should start in one sec-
tor, and then move to others.
Improving the openness and independence of the media, as well
as their analytical scope and responsibility. The objective is to facili-
tate a better understanding of social decisions and to improve, through
public awareness and pressure, the process by which they are made.
Higher quality media can help the growth of trust in institutions in two
ways: by increasing trust in one’s own work, and by increasing the
quality of the political decision-making, which will result in an increase
in trust the citizens place in the government.
Increasing the effectiveness of the judiciary. The objectives are
to increase the trust of the citizens in institutions and particularly to
increase generalised trust. As is well known, generalised trust cannot
develop in a society in which it can be easily taken advantage of. If free
riders are not effectively sanctioned, trust and spirit of cooperation will
evaporate. At the moment, the duration of legal procedures in Croatia
is pushing social trust to the edge of irrationality.
Increasing public information about the EU. The objective is to
improve the quality of trust in the EU via better knowledge of its role
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and activities, and greater use of its programmes and services. Although
according to the data of the Ministry for European Integration more
than 95% of citizens have heard of the EU, the knowledge of the
Croatian public about the activities, structure and procedures of the EU
is still very modest. The formal educational system in Croatia has to
assume a central role in providing systematic information about the EU.
Improving the educational level of the population. The objec-
tives are to increase value convergence and improve the capacity of the
public to obtain and understand relevant information (***, 2003a). In
order to accomplish this, a fundamental reform of the educational sys-
tem, at all levels, is necessary. Bearing in mind that Croatia is lagging
behind the educational average of the EU (10% of college educated
people, in comparison to the EU average of 17%, *** 2003a:5; ***,
2003b:13), it is of particular importance to introduce fundamental
changes in the system of higher education. The reform should increase
the quality, innovativeness, and capacity of the system.
Increasing the effectiveness of the government. The objective is
to increase the trust that citizens place in the state institutions - partic-
ularly in the government - through the increase in satisfaction with the
efficiency of the decision-makers. In order to achieve this, a number of
actions must be carried out with the task of:
• attaining greater professionalism in the public services, which, apart
from setting up a cult of expertise and professional ethics, also
requires an effective division of political from economic roles; where
interests of the ruling party are above the public ones, professionalism
is necessarily in short supply;
• creating greater transparency of the work in the ministries and other
government offices and establishing a more timely and comprehen-
sive dialogue between the decision-makers and the public;
• personalising responsibility for decisions made; faulty decisions and
inadequate practices for which no one is liable remain the basic source
of the lack of trust in institutions.
i Inglehart recently demonstrated that the West and the East differ significantly in
their levels of post-materialism (Inglehart and Baker, 2000).
ii For empirical confirmation cf. Deflem and Pampel (1996).
iii Here we leave aside numerous criticisms of the conception of social capital, particu-
larly in the Putnam version, pointing out the theoretical lack of clarity and excessive
scope, simplified empirical measuring, the neglect of negative forms of social capital
(mafia) and so on (Grix, 2001; Woolcock, 1998; Hospers and Van Lochem, 2002).
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iv Social capital can be defined as a set of cultural features that create and retain trust
and cooperation in a given community (Štulhofer, 2001). Social capital is the char-
acteristic of a community and hence is reflected in everyday interactions.
v Our understanding of the category of civility is different from the one proposed by
Billante and Saunders (2002). By civility they refer mainly to respect for other mem-
bers of the community.
vi The index includes the following violations of norms: use of social privileges to
which one is not entitled, tax cheating, bribing to avoid paying taxes, use of nar-
cotics, dumping trash in public areas, driving too fast, drinking and driving, public
transport fare avoidance, lying for personal gain, and receiving bribe.
vii A number of authors have referred to lack of trust in transition countries stressing
the negative effects of widespread corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Mishler and
Rose, 1997; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002).
viii Best illustrated by the empirically questionable attempt to argue for fundamental dif-
ferences in the perception of democracy in the West and the East (Fuchs and
Klingemann, 2002).
ix In other words, this assumes a sequential influence of economic and non-economic
factors on trust in the EU.
x GDP is significantly correlated with generalised trust (r = .12), trust in institutions
(r = .12), civility (r = .04), social connectedness (r = .27), post-material values (r = .21)
and satisfaction with democracy (r = .36) and with the government (r = .37).
xi Another possibility is that the relationship between GDP and trust in the EU is curvi-
linear.
xii Laitin’s (2002) claim that a common culture already exists in Europe is based main-
ly on evidence about the convergence of pop-culture tastes in European countries.
Laitin claims to find evidence of a common culture in the dominance of English, the
preference for American films and a global pop music. Although at one place he
points to the unpopularity of the European film, Laitin never for a moment thinks that
the cultural novelties he notices might be described as Americanisation. In our opin-
ion, the phenomenon he is describing indicates something completely different from
what we should call a common European culture.
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